The Pope's COP28, the oilmen's COP28, the last COP to save the goal of 1.5° C, the COP of adaptation, the COP28 of failure and hope. There are many interpretations, almost divinatory, to be made of the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP) convened by the UNFCCC, the UN climate change framework. These interpretations are all potentially correct, but none truly revealing of what this negotiation will be like because the outcome is always a surprise.

70,000 participants ‒ a record number ‒ are expected, including negotiators, delegates, press, activists, businesses, lobbyists, and various extras inside Dubai's Expo City, and perhaps never before has the focus on negotiation seemed so strong as this year. Perhaps it is the role of the presidency placed in the hands of an oilman, or the limited freedom of dissent, or the presence ( lacking due to illness) of the Pontiff, or the fact that more and more citizens are expressing concern after a 2023 record high temperature since there have been mercury columns.

In the multicolored array of commentators who deign to talk about climate diplomacy only to exploit its media spotlight, there are already those who have decried its failure, uselessness, ineffectiveness, without even knowing what negotiations really are. Background noise, however, is best suppressed.

Better, then, to sort it all out and try to understand what is really on the table at COP28, what we can expect, and how this umpteenth UN negotiation, which Renewable Matter will follow live from the 30th of November to the 12th of December (although then again, you know you can always go way overtime), will work.

Mitigation, or how to reduce emissions

According to the Paris Agreement, all countries on Earth must commit to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, methane, f-gases, etc.) to limit global warming to well below 2°C compared to temperatures in the late 1800s, and ideally no more than 1.5°C. The commitments of each signatory nation are defined by a document known as the NDC, which is a statement of intent to pursue, which every 5 years is to be revised upward, that is, increasing its ambition.

The COP requires countries to transparently report their emissions and actions, provides technical and financial tools for LDCs, but does not obligate anyone to implement their NDCs. It is up to society, business, and politics to act to reduce their emissions. The Paris Agreement and the COP offer only one framework for action, shared by all.

2023 is important because all countries will report on their progress through a five-year review mechanism, the Global Stocktake, analyzed and approved by the assembly. As expected, progress on emissions reductions has been minimal, amid wars and sloth on the part of many countries, and we need to accelerate.

On the negotiating table, then, there must be additional targets that will put pressure on countries that have done the least for decarbonization. One of these is the medium-term phase-out of fossil fuel use, however, this is opposed by those states that have historically emitted less than the U.S., Europe, and other countries in the global North. 

With a low probability, Dubai could come up with a commitment to phase out coal by 2050 and a target to phase down all oil and gas emissions (with a date to be determined), with the additional wording of "unabated," meaning that full phase out would only be for fossil fuels used without emission reduction or capture technologies (Carbon Capture and Storage - CCS, or Carbon Capture and Usage, CCU), a goal shared by Europe and the US.

If such a target were to be approved there would be an expected boom in investment in all CO₂ reduction and capture technologies, including technologies for flaring and fugitive emissions of CH₄, i.e. methane - which we will discuss in a moment If this were to happen - given that it would still impact the fossil market - it would still be a major advance.  Such a position is frowned upon by India, which uses large amounts of coal and has not made investments in CCS, by Russia and other BRICS countries, while China has not yet been entirely clear on what position it will take.

Critical will be the role of the Emirati presidency under Sultan al Jabar, who for the time being has been swept up in the embarrassing news (however, returned to sender by Al Jabar) that he used his role as chairman of the negotiations to sign new oil contracts for ADNOC, the state-owned oil and gas company.

Under enormous global media pressure, however, he may be pushed for new commitment after half of civil society has called for his replacement. Yet this COP will not be the final showdown with Big Oil, potentially postponed until 2025, hopefully with a better geopolitical framework (although the mood in Europe and the U.S. is among the worst for the climate).

Moving forward with renewables and methane

The recent joint announcement by the U.S. and China to triple renewables by 2030 and double energy efficiency (and respective investments), on the other hand, could be seen by all as an easy goal to convert into results, given that it is considered an economic development lever by the two superpowers, and one on which Europe is aligned. There are few obstacles that are expected to stand in the way of the inclusion of this decision in the final document. A plausible and easily achievable outcome.

What remains to be seen, however, is whether Russia and other petrostates will oppose a quantified reduction target for methane fugitive emissions and flaring in the energy sector, which is critical to reducing a greenhouse gas up to 80 times more potent than CO₂ and which could have significant impacts on slowing climate change in the short term.

For years the U.S., a major producer of unconventional (shale gas), has been lobbying for this goal (which would give it a competitive market advantage, of course). Now the go-ahead would also come from China, as well as from the entire coalition of 150 countries in the Global Methane Pledge, a voluntary framework that supports nations to take action to collectively reduce methane emissions by 30 percent, compared to 2020 levels, by 2030.

The framework also includes the UAE, which would have every interest in cleaning its soul with a result. Hardly a minor one. It is time to turn voluntary commitments into obligations. "If it's just a pledge, it will land with a thump" Rachel Kyte, former World Bank climate envoy, told Reuters. "The UAE needs to commit companies and countries to sit down and negotiate a binding agreement to eliminate methane."

Adaptation Goal?

The Global Adaptation Goal (GGA) is a collective commitment under Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement to "enhance [the world's] adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change." Proposed by the African Group of Negotiators in 2013 and established in 2015, the GGA is intended to serve as a unifying framework that can guide policy action and financing for adaptation on the same scale as mitigation.

However, at present, it has not definitively established specific and measurable goals and guidelines for global adaptation action, nor created mechanisms to enhance adaptation funding to support developing countries. Not an easy effort, given that strategies are often hyper-local, differing from country to country, and with complex assessments for funding. At COP28, negotiators will work to finalize and implement the GGA.

After years of slow progress, countries agreed at COP26 in Glasgow to implement a two-year initiative to further define the GGA, renamed the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh Work Program (GlaSS), resulting in eight technical workshops during 2022 and 2023 to illustrate different views and objectives among parties and stakeholders. The GlaSS program is expected to end at COP28 with an annual report. Which, however, will be approved - perhaps - in extremis at the end of negotiations, given the many parts still open. Should that happen, it would be a big step forward.

Loss&Damage & Climate Finance

Will the famous $100 billion a year (a goal that was supposed to be reached in 2020) for climate finance be reached? We shall see what announcements are to come during the summit, given the large attendance of heads of state (big absentees are Joe Biden and Xi Jinping), but by now the quota should be met. Indeed, it is time to announce a new economic target for 2030 and beyond, which should be aligned with the new NDCs in 2025.

How much can industrialized nations put on the table, perhaps with proceeds from carbon markets or a global carbon tax, the only mechanisms that could increase economic commitments? Has the time come to include China among the industrialized nations? Highly interesting topics yet I doubt they will be addressed at the COP, although it has almost more visibility and prominence today than the UN General Assembly.

The media has all the attention for a minor but not irrelevant dish, namely the mechanism most awaited by small island states and the most vulnerable countries, the Loss&Damage Fund. In early November, negotiators found a possible convergence to establish a loss and damage fund for vulnerable nations to deal with climate change-related disasters. The fund is expected to be hosted on an interim basis by the World Bank, for the first four years, despite objections from several developing countries and the United States.

Less developed nations have called for a more transparent form that clearly defines how the burden of disbursing resources for the fund falls on the wealthier nations that have historically issued the most (read: US, EU, Japan). Concerns that the World Bank lacks the independence to administer the fund, despite assurances from so many leaders that it is the best way to disburse any resources quickly, have not yet been resolved.

We expect a series of economic pledges, starting with the UAE itself, to populate the Loss&Damage Fund, during the Heads of State Parade on the 2nd and 3rd of November. Among other things, Italy, too, Climate Envoy Francesco Corvaro said, is expected to announce the renewal of the 334-million-euro Pledge to the Green Climate Fund, which will be in addition to the 840-million-euro per year (until 2026) Italian Climate Fund's allocation for mitigation and adaptation.

Another important topic on finance: final recommendations for a global carbon market (on which agreement was lacking in Egypt) were agreed, paving the way for approval during COP28. Under the Paris Agreement, governments can create tradable carbon credits on a market overseen by the United Nations. The agreement includes guidelines for companies and nations to receive verified carbon credits, as well as which projects can offset carbon credits. A hot topic, especially for the non-governmental world that argues that carbon credits can circumvent the implementation of real mitigation policy, a criticism that, however, could be obviated with a truly effective verification and monitoring mechanism.

This article is also available in Italian / Questo articolo è disponibile anche in italiano

Immagine: UNClimateChange via Flick